

# Cybersecurity is a solved problem

so uh ... why are breaches still happening?

## whoami

- I was a software developer, once
- Principal Security Consultant / Pentester @ Tier Zero
- DEFCON 32 speaker 2024 / security researcher
  - CVE-2024-38200 - MS Outlook and MS Office
  - CVE-2024-38020 - MS Outlook
- MSRC bug bounty leaderboard Q1 and Q2 2024
- Off By One speaker 2025 (Singapore)



**GALESBURG PRESENTS**  
**HOLY FUCK**

**SAN FRANCISCO BATH HOUSE**  
MONDAY DECEMBER 15 2008

TICKETS FROM SLOWBOAT RECORDS  
OR WWW.UTR.CO.NZ POSTER BY  
MADLEY@ARTISTS.COM

**HANDSOME FURS**  
+SPECIAL GUESTS

WED 26<sup>TH</sup> AUGUST  
SAN FRANCISCO BATH HOUSE

**HEALTH**

**HEALTH**

PRESENTED BY  
GALESBURG  
MYSTERY GIRL  
AND SMO GUY

AUCKLAND  
FEBRUARY 19  
TRANSMISSION RM

WELLINGTON  
FEBRUARY 20  
SAN FRANCISCO  
BATH HOUSE

TICKETS FROM UNDERTHEBAR.CO.NZ / REAL GROOVY / SLOWBOAT  
GALESBURG.CO.NZ / MYSTERYGIRL.CO.NZ / POSTER BY HABLEY@ARTISTS.COM

**DEERHUNTER**

PRESENTED BY: GALESBURG

DATE: WEDNESDAY 11 JUNE 2009

VENUE: SAN FRANCISCO BATH HOUSE, 1008 ST  
KATE, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94109, USA  
POSTER: www.underthebar.com

**WHY?**

GALESBURG & STRANGENEWS PRESENT WHY? LIVE WITH SPECIAL GUESTS  
11 DECEMBER - BUCKLE UP! - AUCKLAND | 18 DECEMBER - SPIN - WELLINGTON  
TICKETS FROM SLOWBOAT RECORDS AND UTR.CO.NZ

**WHY?**

**GALESBURG PRESENTS**

**STAR STALK**

WITH SUPPORT FROM DROPKICK COUSINS

24 JANUARY 2009 SAN FRANCISCO BATH HOUSE

TICKETS FROM SLOWBOAT RECORDS AND UTR.CO.NZ

**The National**

TUE 15 JAN 08 AT THE KINGS ARMS IN AUCKLAND  
WITH THE VIETNAM WAR AND GUESTS  
TICKETS FROM REAL GROOVY / POSTER BY MADLEY@ARTISTS.COM

**Explosions in the Sky**

with Eluvium (usa) and guests

11 Feb Cuckland Kings Arms 12 Feb Wellington San Francisco Bath House

Labels from slowboat records, wellington and real groovy auckland www.explosionsinthesky.com poster design: holly@artists.com

**PAVEMENT**

1<sup>ST</sup> MARCH 2010 - AUCKLAND TOWN HALL

TICKETS FROM TICKETEX WWW.TICKETEX.CO.NZ WWW.MYSTERYGIRL.CO.NZ WWW.GALESBURG.CO.NZ

**SUFJAN STEVENS**

RUSHMORE, GROOVE GUIDE & 958FM  
IN ASSOCIATION WITH MYSTERY GIRL AND RADIO ACTIVE PRESENT

**BROKEN SOCIAL SCENE**

GALESBURG and STRANGENEWS present

AUCKLAND WED FEBRUARY 20<sup>TH</sup> WELLINGTON THURS FEBRUARY 21<sup>ST</sup>

TICKETS AVAILABLE FROM REAL GROOVY (AUCKLAND) and SLOW BOAT RECORDS (WELLINGTON)

**LES SAVY FAV**

TUES 1 FEB, KINGS  
WED 2 FEB, SFB

TICKETS FROM SLOW BOAT RECORDS.

**LIGHTNING BOLT**

AUCKLAND THURS FEB 19  
WELLINGTON WED FEB 25

## disclaimer

- some of the techniques you see are illegal, without prior consent
- there are safe places to practice:
  - PentesterLab
  - Hack The Box
  - Bug Bounty Programs (read the rules and stay in scope)

## why this talk

- the NCSC estimated that the total loss to NZ in 2024 from cybercrime was 1.6 billion
- In the 2024/2025 financial year:
  - 5995 reports were recieved to the NCSC
  - 331 were triaged as having 'national significance' which meant extra support
- New Zealand's Cyber Security Strategy 2026-2030 was released in Feb:
  - a good blueprint for collective action against threats, worth a read!
  - <https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/cyber-security-strategy>

## the outcomes of cybercrime are varied

- frequently it results in theft/exfiltration of 'personal information'
- can be extremely damaging, both to individuals and organisations
- sometimes it's economic, business disruption, destruction of data...

## but haven't we solved this already?

- yes? no? maybe?
- we have a lot of things that can help us
- but there are a lot of reasons that they don't get implemented

# what we're going to talk about

- some shared definitions
- the essential 8 (yay) - mitigation strategies
  - NZ has NCSC Critical Controls which overlap
- how breaches can happen
- what low friction security controls we have to prevent it
- why it's hard and what change can look like in your organisation

## what this isn't

- a cybersecurity professional telling you to simply fix all the things
  - the industry has enough people trying to beat you over the head with the cyber stick
  - the best outcomes come from collectively learning and fixing together
- the sky is falling because of AI (it's not)
- "XYZ tool would have solved ABC data breach"

## some shared definitions:

- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)
- Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
- Zero day: an unknown vulnerability that does not have a fix
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)

## more definitions

- workstation: someones device like a laptop
- internet facing server: another computer that has some things exposed on the internet
- sandbox: a way of keeping programs separate.
  - browsers are pretty well sandboxed
- powershell: a clackity clackity interface that allows for programmatic interaction with a computer

## unto the breach

- Data breach
  - Help someone has stolen data
- Confidentiality breach
  - Help someone has stolen secret data
- Privacy breach
  - Help someone has stolen personal data

## sensitive data/information

- sensitive personal information (thanks OPC ❤️)

Sensitive personal information is information about the individual that has some real significance to them, is revealing of them, or generally relates to matters that an individual might wish to keep private.

- this is largely what we want to keep safe and secure

## the essential 8:

- patch applications
- patch operating systems
- **multi-factor authentication** ❤️
- restrict administrative privileges ❤️
- application control ❤️
- restrict Microsoft Office macros ❤️
- user application hardening
- regular backups

## the essential 8 is...

- a baseline, designed to help secure systems
- mitigations for common security issues that can make it hard for a threat actor to do things
- clear practical steps that an organisation can take to help secure their stuff
- made up of different maturity levels for a range of organisations

## the essential 8 is not...

- a definitive and final plan
- a recommendation for any specific product or service
  - organisations will have to make their own decisions about what is appropriate

## a note about users

- end users are frequently cited as taking risky actions which result in compromise
  - they clicked a link! bad user!
- it is the job of the security practitioner to fix this for the user
- give them guardrails, give them protections that help keep them safe, give them an easy secure path

# pinning breaches on 'human error' is incredibly disingenuous

'Human error was a major contributing cause in 95% of all breaches.' – IBM Cyber Security Intelligence Index Report.

- have you tried designing systems resistant to human error???

## a note about measuring change

- you might do all the things, but traditional security metrics can make it hard to measure whether the change has been effective
- reasons breaches/security events don't happen:
  - people don't do cybercrime against you
  - people do cybercrime against you but the security controls are effective

# unsafe at any speed

## The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile

- written by consumer advocate Ralph Nader in the 1960's
- car manufacturers were generally reluctant to spend money on improving safety
- Nader argued that cars were designed in ways that made them inherently dangerous, and that safety features were ignored in favor of styling and cost-cutting : "user experience"
- the book resulted in the creation of the United States Department of Transportation



# UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED

The Designed-In Dangers  
of The American Automobile  
By Ralph Nader



## sound familiar?

- Chapter 7: "Damn the driver and spare the car"
- discusses the "way vehicular crashes and harm was placed on the driver."
- alleges that "Engineering, Enforcement and Education" was created by the industry
- "Enforcement and Education" meant the driver
- "Engineering" was all about the road
- maybe the author of that IBM report should read this

## tech and security is having a slow realisation that we have been here before

- one of the favourite pastimes of tech people is reinventing things that already exists
- see elon musk and the train
- cybersecurity can and should learn from other industries

## How breaches happen, at a high level

- ClickFix
- Phishing
- malicious documents
- other breaches/password reuse

## wtf is clickfix

- a technique that tricks users into running commands
  - turns out computers can do that
- "Verify you are human"
- can be a fake CAPTCHA, browser, system errors, windows update

## Verification Steps

1. Press Windows Button "⊞" + R
2. Press CTRL + V
3. Press Enter

## Follow 3 steps for verification

**Step 1: Press Windows Button"⊞" + R**

**Step 2: Press CTRL V**

**Step 3: Press Enter**



**Something went wrong while displaying this webpage.**

There was an error during the latest update of browser version, causing some web pages to malfunction.

Follow these instructions to resolve the issue:

1. Click the 'Copy fix' button below.
2. Right-click on the Windows icon
3. Select 'Windows PowerShell (Admin)'
4. Right-click within the open terminal window.
5. Wait for the update to complete, then refresh the page.

Copy fix

Close

## what happens

- JavaScript (the scripting language that runs in a browser) silently copies the naughty thing to the clipboard
- the screen says: Hit Win+R then Ctrl-V
  - Win+R is the run window
- varying degrees of fun things happen to your computer

## like..

- malware
- Remote Access Trojans
  - allows for full computer control
- infostealers
  - steal browser credentials, saved credentials and other things
- ✨ ransomware ✨

## ok but how do i (or a security team) prevent this?

- essential 8 recommends "application control"
- this can mean:
  - restricting Win+R run dialog
  - restricting PowerShell
- most normal users won't need these things! honestly!
- the average sysadmin has the ability to disable these things for users

## phishing 🐟

- an old favourite of all sorts of threat actors
- from serious ransomware operators to spam generators
- user clicks a link
  - like i mentioned, browsers are frequently sandboxed
- the bad thing happens when a user gives over their credentials

## ah but I have MFA

- well, some MFA is phishable (and some is phishing resistant - we'll get to that)
- serious phishing attempts using a transparent proxy
- allows for a Person in The Middle (PitM) attack
- MFA tokens can also be stolen and relayed directly to the legitimate service (OWA, Azure etc)


# evil nginx

- nginx is a server
- evil nginx is...the evil version?
  - used to proxy/forward requests between users and legitimate servers
- what even is the point of making a tool if you can't make a cool logo



## pitm

- a classic person in the middle attack
- someone sends link
- user clicks link
- enters credentials
  - and enters OTP!
- credentials and token are proxied / forwarded to legitimate service
- session generated and captured by hackeroo



phishlet  
config

login.m1cr0softonline.com

GET /login

GET /login

200  
<login pge HTML>

200  
<login page HTML>

## what even is MFA

- two or more of the following:
  - something you know (a password, pin or passphrase)
  - something you have (a security key, a passcard, a one time password, a smartphone)
  - something you are, such as your face geometry or fingerprint.

## not all MFA are created equal

- MFA tokens can be phished, as we discovered
- some, like those from hardware tokens (little devices that plug into USB) are 'phishing resistant'
- let's see how that works!

# FIDO

open, phishing-resistant authentication protocols developed by the FIDO Alliance to eliminate over-reliance on passwords.

- uses public key cryptography!
- tl;dr private and public key:
  - public key is designed to be shared
  - no issues if someone finds it!
  - robust and battle tested

## another cool thing about this protocol

- the protocol/factor is 'bound' to the site/URL
- if a user is phished, and tries to enter credentials to a fraudulent site?





Browser  
login.microsoftonline.com



login.microsoftonline.com



Browser  
login.microsoftonline.com



login.m1cr0softonline.com

## we can remove passwords altogether

- passwords have been known to be an incredibly weak link for years
- even MS has 'Windows Hello'
  - replaces password with "something you have" (the device)
  - and "something you are" (biometrics)
  - or "something you know" (PIN).
  - surprisingly effective
- a good example of an easy & secure path

## passkeys are also good option

- built on "public key cryptography" also
- made up of the "public key"
  - which is stored by the website
- and the private key
  - which is stored on your device

## passkeys (continued)

- key pairs are unique to each site, unlike passwords
- can be software based (like icloud/password managers)
- can be hardware based (like hardware tokens)
- these can remove the need for passwords as well as helping protect against phishing

## Malicious documents

- Microsoft allows for various scripting languages to be run in Excel, Word etc
- great for data processing and repeatable tasks
- they also allow for a document to interact with non-document things:
  - powershell
  - cmd.exe
  - other malicious executables (bundles of code that do bad things on a computer)

## Microsoft knows this is an issue

- they have the concept of Mark of the Web
- any document downloaded from an untrusted zone / the internet, contains a little flag.
- when the document opens, if MOTW is present, all those features are temporarily disabled.
- until you click some buttons.
- a lot of my security research has been bypassing these controls in MS

Microsoft Outlook Security Notice



**Microsoft Office has identified a potential security concern.**

**This location may be unsafe.**

http://microsoft.com

## just disable them

- some users do have a legitimate business need for them
- disabling users who don't need them can decrease risk
- once again, the essential 8 is to the point here
  - restrict Microsoft Office macros

## restrict administrative privileges

- this is a tricky one.
- people need to be able to do their jobs and frequently require a high level of control over their device
  - developers, sysadmins
- giving people admin rights is the ultimate 'make it go' moment
- this can backfire, but we need to try

## local admin on windows is very powerful

- local admin has access to secret and credential material for all other users on the device
- on shared servers/workstations where multiple people log in, this is very dangerous

## how?

- I tested an organisation (several) who had roughly 800 users, of which ~500 were in a 'local admins' users group
- made 'lateral movement' (aka moving to other computers) extremely straightforward.
- found a Domain Administrator who had logged in to a shared device
- extracted credential material and used it to authenticate: game over :-)

## so we've solved it, why aren't people simply doing these things?

- "hardware MFA is expensive"
- "people will just lose them"
- "we don't have enough USB spaces on laptops"
- "if we remove people from the local admins group, everything will break"
- "we have a ten thousand seat organisation, we can't do it"

## "hardware MFA is expensive"

- did you see the cost of breaches slide earlier?
- hardware tokens represent a fairly good return on investment
  - compare it to the per host cost of phishing training
- security teams are frequently seen as a cost centre
  - let's reframe security teams to a enabler of the business

## "people will just lose them"

- please believe in people
- most people won't lose them
- somehow people manage to drop their phones all the time yet we still push MS authenticator pretty hard
- we have gotten used to the idea that you need a key for your car, why not your computer?
- this is why processes and service desks exist

## "if we remove people from the local admins group, everything will break"

- sometimes breaking things is ok
  - says the guy who has broken things sometimes
- how you recover from this is important
- you don't have to do it all at once, you can start small

## "we don't have enough USB spaces on laptops"

- "we have 2 USB, and once the keyboard, mouse and headset is in, nothing is left"
- docks exist
- bluetooth exists
  - ■ depending on the organisation

## it's hard and the process sucks sometimes

- things will break
- change is hard and it's hard to bring people along
- it starts when you can demonstrate that the new thing you want to do is:
  - safer
  - easier
  - less annoying
- but also, you have to try

## you don't have to do it all at once

- start with the users who you want to protect the most
  - administrators, anyone with privileged access
- roll it out gradually
- it's ok if you need to roll it back temporarily!

## what you can do right now

- ask for a hardware key from your CISO, CTO, CEO
- add it as an MFA option to the important stuff
- remove legacy MFA where hardware tokens/whatever are supported

## what you can do in a month

- (if you're a security or IT person) talk to other parts of the business and users about what you're doing in the auth space
  - do it with kindness and without judgement
- if you have successful outcomes, share them with the business
- think about the edge cases
- measure change through things like:
  - hardware MFA adoption rates
  - passkey adoption rates

i believe in you

# thanks!

- thanks to the OPC for having me ❤️
- thanks to my coworkers and wider information security colleagues for the enthusiastic discussions

questions?